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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the sequence of short-run quantity-constrained
equilibria of a model with a single storable output, labor and money.
The durability of output gives rise to inventory fluctuations which
influence the course of the equilibria attained.
One special feature of interest is the assumption that prices are
not at the level which would equilibrate all markets if there were no
stochastic shocks to the economy. With prices frozen at this level, the
nature of the realized shocks determines the type of disequilibrium realized
and the unintended component of inventory change.
The analysis concentrates on two questions: What is the statistical
nature' of the process governing the real wage, output, employment and
inventories? And is it possible to test this model against the alternative
hypothesis that prices are continually flexible even after the shocks
have disturbed the system? We find that although these theories are similar
in their qualititive structure, tests can be developed. We also show
how the frequencies of different types of quantity-constrained equilibria
vary with the stochastic specification. This may shed some insight on why
it is commonly believed that some types 9f disequilibrium phenomena have
not been observed.
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Introduction
The microeconomic foundation of macroeconomics has two fairly well-
articulated paradigms. The neo-classical paradigm maintains that "markets
are working":competitive behavior achieves a Pareto optimal outcome under
the guidance of the price system. Authorities should interfere as little
as possible with this allocation mechanism as long as competitive behavior is
maintained. The lack of future and contingent markets pointed out by some
has been overcome through the assumption of rational expectations. The
Keynesian paradigm on the contrary maintains that "markets are not working".
Price rigidities, even with competitive behavior, lead to a misallocation of
resources which can be partially remedied by government interventions. This
malfunctioning of the price system is explained by informational consider-
ations in the absence of a complete set of markets. The Keynesian paradigm
has recently received an extreme formalization in the work of Barro and
Grossman [1971], Benassy [1975], Dr~ze [1975], Malinvaud [1977] and others,
through the theoretical construct of fixed-price equilibria.
Although the assumption of fixed prices provides a reasonable ex-
planation of a number of short-run phenomena, such as the multiplier effect
or the accelerator principle, it is incomplete in that it fails to provide
a theory to determine the level at which prices are fixed. The short-run
equilibria attained will be markedly affected by the mechanism used to
describe price formation. Via this route, the dynAmics of macroeconomic
fluctuations are affected by the price change proc(-'ss as well.
,
The basic assumption of this paper is an attempt to be specific about
price formation while retaining a fixed-price, qllantity-constrained equili-
bration in the short-run. We assume that prices are.fixed at the beginning
of the period' at the level which would be the Halrasian· equilibrium if all
random factors in the economy had their average levels. We will refer to
this as anticipatory pricing. Thus there is a tendency toward market
clearing, but short-run disturbances continually keep it from being achieved.
This assumption should be contrasted with that previously used in the
disequilibrium literature where measured excess demands were responsible for
price changes in the following period. Anticipatory pricing has the advan-
tage of being simpler, especially in the analysis of the stochastic evolution
of the system. Furthermore, as the empirical evidence does not provide'
support for the hypothesis that excess demand is a principal determinant of
price changes, we felt that it was necessary to explore an alternative. Our assumrt:ion is
somewhat intermediate between the Walrasian (flexible prices) and Keynesian
short-run (fixed prices) models, and it has n certain "rational expectations"
flavor.*
The second theme of this paper is the role of inventories in macro-
dynamics a topic of long-recognized importance, but one which has not re-
ceived much attention within the disequilibrium literature.** This is rather
ironic, as it is commonplace to assert that the role of such stocks is to
cushion the effects of unforeseen fluctuations in demands and supplies,
presumably those that are undesired at the prevailing prices. We will
* It is not, however, a full "rational expectations" model because the
rational forecasts of future prices do not enter the current notional demand
curves. This will be discussed further in the next section.
** Blinder-Fischer (1979) have examined flexible price models with inven-
tories in which the rate of interest is a determinant of the desired level
of inventory stocks. They do not address the stochastic nature of the dynam-
ics explicity, whereas this is our principal focus. Blinder (977) has examined
a Keynesian model with inventories and a price dynamics that responds to
lagged excess demands. Muellbauer and Partes (1978) have a short-run quantity
constrained model with inventories based on explicit maximization by rational
agents. They derive the effective demand functions to which our specification
can be regarded as a first-order approximation. Although they have obtained
many short-run comparative statics results they have not linked the successive
quantity-constrained equilibria together in a dynamic analysis.
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analyze how the level of inventories interacts with the level of prices
and wages, and how the spillover effects in a fixed-price equilibrium
produce certain testable characteristics in macro time series data.
We will argue that these can be used to discriminate between a model of the
type we study and the analagous flexible-price system.
In Section 1 we set out the basic model and discuss its assumptions.
Section 2 derives the short-run quantity-constrained equilibrium as it
depends on initial inventory stocks and on the random disturbances within
the period. Section 3 presents, for comparison purposes, the analagous
results under conditions of full price flexibility after these shocks
are realized.
Sections 4 and 5 are the heart of the paper. We first derive the
probabilistic nature of the equilibrium under a variety of stochastic
specifications. The probabilities of different types of quantity constrained
equilibria can be compared under these alternative hypotheses. Then, we
use these results to present the dynamics of inventory behavior and the
statistical relationships between real wages, inventories and employment.
We emphasize the possibility of using this type of analysis to test the
disequilibrium hypothesis with anticipatory pricing, against the market-
clearing assumptions.
Our theoretical model suggests several lines of empirical investigation.
In an appendix, we present some time series evidence on the relationships
between the important variables of our system. These are of a preliminary
nature and are not des1gned to test our view of the theory presented. They
are nevertheless suggestive particularly because of the unexpectedly large
effect of inventories on the real wage.
Rational a~entR should recognize t~e influence of firms' inventories on
their future profit irtcome, but we have neglected that as well. In future
work we. will addr.'e§slsavings ~nd asset markets, uarticulaIly the relationb~t:WQ~h rt\~rley afU ;! c. -Hms t, ',ital as stores ot value, . n disequilibrium.
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1. The Model
Basic Structure
The model to be described below has two stores of value, money and in-
ventories, which interact together with the flow demands and supplies on
the labor and output markets to determine a short-run equilibrium. Successive
short-run equilibria are linked together by the dynamics of inventory move-
ments and the prices and wages which result from them.
Before deriving the stochastic structure of this dynamic disequilibrium
process, we should discuss the nature of the model -- and especially the
central role to be played by inventories and the price formation mechanism.
Inventories are accumulated as the result of an excess of output over sales
*to consumers. It is assumed that such sales of output are entirely con-
sumed; the inventories are owned exclusively by firms. Similarly, money
balances are held only by households. They are used to finance purchases
of goods in excess of labor income. Both inventory levels and real money
balances are desired because they provide the individual decision makers
with flexibility in case they are unable to fully execute their desired trans-
actions. In the aggregate, therefore, we will assume a positive desired in-
ventory stock and that the level real balances enters the demand and supply
** ***function of households.
* Bl inder (1978) offers an extensive discussion of inventories as inputs, but
finally assumes that their role as residual output is dominant, as we do.
**It should be mentioned, or rather confessed, at the outset, thattl1is form-
ulation does not treat the role of firms' profits and their imputation back
to the household sector in a consistent fashion. Implicitly, any money balances
accumulated by firms are immediately transferred back to the household sector,
but these profits are not anticipated at all. Hnner competitive conditions --
that is with many households, each of whom treats profit income as independent
of their own actions -- this formalization is consistent with a 100% profits
tax and a monetary policy designed to keep the nominal stock of money constant.
***
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Because firms wish·to maintain some inventories, part of planned pro-
duction may be intended for inventory accumulation. An increase in inven-
tory stocks is not, by itself, enough to indicate that fi rms could not sell
all they wanted to. The actual variation in these stocks is a composite of
the intended and unintended changes.
The price-setting process is conceptualized as follows: Time is measured
in discrete intervals. The level of inventories is known at the beginning of
each period. Further the expected values of demands and supplies of goods and labor
as functions of the nominal prices and the stocks of money and inventories
are known. These functions may differ from their expected values because
of unforeseeable, random events. Prices are set during the period at
the values that would clear the market if these expectations were all
realized. During the period they remain rigid, and it is this inflexibility
which is the source of the disequilibrium dynamics that we will be studying.
Obviously the extreme nature of this process is not to be justified
on the grounds that it precisely represents the workings of any economy.
Moreover, the length of the period affects the extent of the disequilibrium
generated by the temporarily frozen price levels in a serious way, and no
one choice can really be defended. Nevertheless we believe that the study
of this model can provide useful insights and that it can be viewed as an
approximation to an actual economy in which a variety of disequilibrium
adjustments are taking place simultaneously. After giving an algebraic
statement of the model, we will return to such a discussion.
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Mathematical Specification
In order to make the model tractable we will impose a linear struc-
ture on the supply and demand functions. Following Barra - Grossman (1971)
and Malinvaud (1977) the amount by which an agent is constrained below his
desired level of purchase or sale in one market enters intb the determination
of his desired trade in the other market. These "spillover effects" are
also assumed to be linear. For the production sector we have
(1.1)
(1. 2)
where
s
xt = desired level of supply (i.e. of actual sales) to the
household sector
£d = desired level of labor demand
·t
Pt,Wt = logarithm of price level and wage rate, respectively
xt'£t actual, market-determined sales and empioyment
St = inventory stocks at the start of the period
s = desired level of inventory stocks in a steady-state
1 3
E ,E = random errors
t t
all in period t.
One should note that if the firm is interested in maximizing the present
value of its profits, expressed in real terms in units of output, it follows
that
(1. 3)
and
(1. 4)
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a = -a > 01 2
Yl = -Y 2 > 0
Suppose that the marginal product of labor is g > 0, and that it is
regarded as a constant over the range of variation we are considering. It
is natural to assume that if the sales are rationed by an additional unit,
sthat is if xt < xt and xt decreases by one unit, then the decreased demand
for labor would be such as to decrease actual output by less than one
unit, the residual being used for inventory accumulation. Thus we have
(1. 5) o < c < llg
This can be derived from the second order conditions for the firm's problem.
Similarly an extra unit constraint on labor demand should be absorbed par-
tially by a reduction in inventory stocks and partially by a decrease in
the volume of goods offered for sale.
(1. 6) o < a < g •
Finally, an extra unit of inventory should result in a mixture of
sales increase and labor demand decrease. However, since the adjustment
made within one period is only partial,
(1. 7)
with
(1. 8)
a o - gyo < 1
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(For a formal derivation of similar restrictions see Blinder and Fischer(l978».
For households we have the behavioral relations
(1. 9)
(1.10)
h Xd and n S h d d f d d ff fw ere ~ are t e eman or goo s an 0 er 0 labor services
t t
respectively.
The theory of household behavior differs from the theoryeor firma
because it is the households who hold money balances. Since we will treat
the case of a constant money stock throughout, nominal prices and price
expectations are sufficient to specify the level of real balances. Because
we take the view that the unit of time is rather short compared with the
planning horizon of the household, the principal determinant of the house-
holds' demand for real balances is its expectation of future prices and
wages. It will be shown below that prices in any period depend solely on the
predetermined inventory level. Moreover, because inventories will follow
astationary Markov process, in the long run the average level of prices
and wages is known. Under these conditions the price and wage expectations
relevant to demands at any moment in time can, to a first approximation, be
regarded as exogenous and fixed. Thus (1.9) and (1.10) include prices
and wages because of their short run effects, but need include neither
*expectations nor money balances explicitly.
The standard theory of consumer behavior over time would give us a
zero degree homogeneity of market behavior in prices and wages for the
* Since (p , w , s ) will follow a Markov process, future values of (p , w )
t t t ..t.. t
can be forecasted from present ones. Thus priceR and wages enter (1..'1) and
(1.10) in their role as predictors as well as through intertemporal substi-
tution effects.
-~-
current and all future periods. If nominal prices in the short run were to
increase, the constancy of long-run expectations would imply a negative
"real-balance effect".
Assuming that consumption and leisure are all normal goods, we have
. that
(1.11)
(1.12)
Further,
(1.13)
follows from standard considerations of demand theory. The signs and
magnitudes of 01 and 02 cannot be derived from such considerations; but we will
sometimes assume that they are both relatively small, as empirical evidence suggests.
Using these conditions to simplify the system we have that
(1.14)
(+) (+) (+)
(1.15)
(- ) (+) (+)
(1.16)
(- ) (+) (+)
(1.17)
(- ) (+) (+)
where the signs indicate the assumptions being made on the indicated
parameter.
Finally, to close the model, we make the standard disequilibrium
theoretic assumption that actual quantities are determined by the "short-
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side" of each market:
(1.18) d xd )xt .. min (xt ' t
(1.19) R, = min (R,d 1s )t t' t
While these quantity adjustment rules can be criticized on several grounds,
they have the great advantage of providing analytical tractibility. They
also lead to a theory that can, in principal, be tested against a corre-
sponding equilibrium theory.
The basic assumption of our model is that Pt and wt are set in advance
at the level that would clear the market if there were zero errors in each
of the behavioral equations. Defining these levels as p~, w~ we have,
(1. 20)
(1. 21)
yielding
(1. 22) p*
t
(1. 23)
Let
(1.24)
Prices are fixed at these
the values of random variables
levels at the beginning of the period, then
1 2 3 4(£ , £ , £ , € ) are realized so that (p*, w*)
t t t t t t
is not a Walrasian equilibrium price system in Reneral. We study a fixed-
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,price equilibrium in which the quantities x and £ serve as the equilibrating
t t
variables. That is, one can imagine sales and employment varying until, at
their equilibrium levels, the system of equations given by (1.14) - (1.19)
is satisfied.
Discussion of the Model
Although there is no firm microeconomic foundation for our assumption
that prices are fixed at their anticipated Wa1rasian levels, and are then
frozen there for the ensuing period, we had several reasons for adopting
such a formulation. It is clear that in any macroeconomic model that deals
with sufficiently short time periods, neither the assumption of perfect
price flexibility nor the assumption of quantity flexibility would be
rea~onable. The world is in continual disequilibrium to a much greater
extent then either pure formalization admits. In this paper we will
emphasize quantities as the equilibrating vRr:l.ables. while recognizi.ng
that this is but one extreme among a continuum of possibilities. In any
context where one adopts either the strict price-flexibility or quantity-
flexibility paradigms, the length of the period in question makes a big
difference as to whether the model does or does not approximate the reality.
Our choice of the price level at the anticipated Wa1rasian equilibrium
should be compared with several other possibilities. Most of the literature
*on disequilibrium macroeconomics has assumed that prices adjust from their
lagged values according to the lagged value of excess demand. In our model,
* In the econometrics literature, both adjustment of prices to past excess
demands and partial adjustment to current excess demands have been used (see
for example Fair and Jaffee [1974], Laffont and Garcia [1977]. In the
economic theory literature adjustment to past excess demands has been the
rule (see Honkapohja [1979], Laroque (forthcoming».
/
/
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one of the impacts of previous disequilibria is to alter the level of
stocks. Therefore prices in our model will be higher after a period of
excess demand for goods, as in these systems. The analogous property
does not apply to the wage rate, as labor services are not durable, nor
is there explicitly intertemporal substitution of labor for leisure over
individuals' lifetimes.
These two price adjustment hypotheses are hard to compare on empirical
grounds. One reason why prices are likely to appear responsive to lagged
excess demands is the auto correlation of errors. However, such an obser-
vat ion would not contrad~ct the basic motivation for having an anticipatory
pricing process. For contractual reasons, or because of the difficulty of
monitoring and responding to the current state of disequilibrium t the firms
and workers might try to use pricing rules designed to approximate an
*efficient market-clearing system.
In planned economies there is some evidence that prices are set so
as to approximate equilibria that are forecasted. This may provide a justi-
fication of our anticipatory pricing assumption in modelling such systems.
* To take one alternative, we might suppose that prices are set at the
mathematical expectation of the ex post equilibrium. The difficulty
with this assumption is that the bias of these prices away from ~* , w*)
. t tdepends upon the distribution of the disturbances €. Therefore a complicated
pair of non-linear equations would have to be sOlvea to find the prices and
wages, in contrast to the simple system (1.20) .- (1.21).
Another price-setting mechanism is that prices are only incompletely flexible
within the period. They end up somewhere between their lagged values and the
location of the market-clearing equilibrium. This amounts to an adjustment
in response to current, rather than lagged, excess demands. This hypothesis
is attractive in that the length of the period can be reflected in the speci-
fication of the adjustment speed. Unfortunately we were unable to obtain
tractable dynamic results.
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2. The short-run equilibr~um under quan~ity rationi~
1 2With p~ and w~ fixed by (122) and (123) and after the realization of Et , Et ,
3 4Et , Et , the system (114) - (l.B) can be solved. It is easiest to describe
the dependence of the solution on the E'S by separately analyzing the four
cases in which they are linear.
!egime 1: Excess supply in both markets: Keynesian Uncnployment
8 d
x t > x = xtt
(2.1)
t S > t d = tt t t
We can rewrite (1.14) - (1.17) as
1 0 0 S 1U x Xt + Ett
0 I -b b d + 2xt Xt Et
=
I 0 t d + 3c -c t L t Et
0 0 0 1 t S L + 4t t Et
yielding
8 X +
1
x • e: tt t 123 e: 4)
d -bee: + e: + b(e: -
= ~ + t t t txt = xt I-be
(2.2) 1 2 3 4
t d
-e(e: - e: ) + e: - beE
= t = L +
t t t t
t t t I-be
t S = L + 4t t e: t
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Regime 2: Excess supply on the good market and excess demand on the labor
market: Under Consumption
(2.3)
s d
x > x· ... x
t t t
R,d > 1s .. R.
tt t
The structural equations are
1 0 s .. +
1
a -a xt Xt E: t
0 1 0 0 d 2xt Xt + E: t
::
1 0 R. d + 3c -c Lt E: tt
0 0 0 1 1s + 4Lt E: tt L
yielding
1 2 3 4E: - ac E:t + a(-E: t + E: t )s
... X + txt t 1 - ac
d
"" X +
2
xt
.. x E: tt t
(2.4) 1 2 3 4
R.d ..
-c(E: - E: ) + E:t - ac E: tL + t tt t 1 - ac
1s .. L "" B + 4t t t E: t
Re.s.ime 3: Excess demand in both markets: Repressed inflation
d s
xt
> x
""
x
t t
(2.5)
R.d > 1s .. R. tt t
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The structural equations are:
s Xt +
11 0 a -a xt £t
0 d Xt
20 1 0 xt + £t
-
Rod - 30 0 1 0 t tt + £t
0 1 t S + 4-d d t L t £t
yielding
1 2 3 4
£t - ad £t + a(-£t + £t)
1 - ad
)2.0
t d .. L' + 3t t £t
1 2
- ad 3 + 4d(£ - £t) £t
t S
.. tt .. \: + t
£t
t 1 .,. ad
Regime 4: Excess demand on the good market and excess supply on the labor
market: Classical Unemployment
(2.7)
we have
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1 0 0 0 s Xt
+ 1x
t Et
0 1 -b b d 2x Xt + Ett
=
0 0 1 0 R,d 3
t L t + Et
-d d 0 1 R,s 4t L t + Et
yielding
s 1
xt
.. x .. X + Et t t
-bd 123 4d Et + Et + b(E t - E )Xt +
tx ..
1 - bdt
(2.8)
,td.R,
.. L + 3
t t t Et
1 2 3 4d(E t - e: ) - bd Et + EtR,s
.. L t +
t
t 1 - bd
Within each regime we can study the stability of the natural quantity
adjustment processes
hI
d
x
s ) yt)xt = (min(xt t t(2.9)
hZ
d R,s)
- R, )R,t = (min(R,e t t
where hI and hZ are sign-preserving functions. It follows from an examination
of the linear systems (Z.2)t (2.4)t (Z.6) and (2.8), that this dynamic
adjustment process would be locally stable provided that
,
1 - be > 0
1 - ac > 0
(2.10)"
I - ad > a
1 - bd > a
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For example, suppose that an equilibrium in Regime 1 were disturbed by a
small upward perturbation in sales of ~Xt. This would produce. a lower level
of constraint in the supply of goods and hence an increase of c~x in the
t
demand for labor. The change would give rise ·to more demand for goods by
bc~xt. Summing up the induced increase in demands] stability requires 1 - bc > O.
Now, when we consider the entire equation system in which these
regimes are juxtaposed it has been shown by Gourieroux, Laffont and
Monfort [1978] that the existence and uniqueness of the quantity-constrained
solution is implied when these local stability properties hold within each regime.
Let us compute the constraints on the ~'s such that the realized values
of demands and supplies satisfy the definition of each of the regimes. For
example, assuming that we are in Regime
(2.2) and if they are to satisfy (2.1) we must have that
1 2 b(~3 4 0~ - ~ ~ ) >t t t t
(2.11)
1 2 3 ~4) > 0c(~ - ~ ) - (~ -t t t t
and conversely, if (2.1]) is satisfied, then the solution to (2.2) will lie in
Regime 1. Pursuing this method for the other regimes we find that they are
realized if the £'s lie in the following region~;
Regine 2
4
e: ) > 0
t
(2.12)
Regime 3
(2.13)
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Regime 4 1 2 3 e: 4)(e: - e: t ) - b(e: <0t t t
(2.14)
d(e:1 2 3 4
- e: ) - (e: - e: ) > 0t t t t
A direct comparison of (2.11) - (2.14) reveals that, under the conditions
( ....\ h i f i i f 1 f 11 (1. 2 3 1+)2.1~, t ese reg ons arm a part t on 0 tle space 0 a £t' £t' £t' £t
vectors.
Let
1 1 2
v = £
- £t t t
(2.15)
2 3 4
v = £
- £t t t
One can see directly that the four different regimes can be represented
in the (vI 2)
t' v t
space (see Figure I,next page).
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:',
.~... ';.;,r~':··
,....C~~~b)
.,(1"";,; .,,:: .,1'
.. ,,1;;'
~W£
~f\bd~;
(R~a~lt)
In this fi gure we consider
motivated i the casen the a > b,
next section.
c > d which will be
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3. Short-run equilibria with~~ice flexibility
For future reference, it is useful at this point to derive the
prices, wages and equilibrium quantities that would arise if prices and
wages were to adjust so as to clear both markets after the realization of
the disturbances. Setting (1.14) equal to (1.15), (1.16) equal to (1.17)
and ignoring all the terms involving sp,illover effects we can derive the
following expression for the equilibrium real wage:
(3.1) ~ • (w~ - p~)= [Yo (81 + 82) + a O (01 + 02)] (St - s)
2 1
+ (61 + S2) v t - (01 + 02) v t
where ~ is given by (1.24). Equilibrium employment, and hence output, are
given by
(3.2)
The stability condition on the Walrasian price adjustment process
where wages respond to excess demand in the labor market and prices to
excess demand in the goods market implies that f.. < O. These stability con-
ditions will be satisfied whenever 01 and 02 are relatively small (see
the right hand side of (1.24». The comparative statics of the equilibrium
model with respect to inventories and shocks can be derived in a straight-
forward way. It may be seen that the real wage responds negatively to
initial inventories, positively to shocks that increase the excess demand
for labor, and positively to shocks that increase the excess demand for
goods. These comparative statics are in accordance with one's intuition
that initial inventories are a substitute for labor inputs in the short-run
production process.
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4. ' Probabilistic structure of the short-run quantity'- constrained equilibria
The principal question answered in this section is how the stochastic
specification of the model induces the probabilities that each of the four
types of quantity-constrained equilibria will arise. In complete generality,
the symmetry with which our model treats the goods and labor markets makes
it impossible to derive specific conclusions about this distribution. But
employing plausible qualitative conditions on the parameters, combined
with assumptions on the relative variances of the errors, we find limitations
on the forms of the disequilibria that can arise. Depending on the specification
used, one or two of the regimes can be proven to be much less likely than
the others.
First one should note the obvious point that anticipatory price
setting makes the nature of the equilibrium independently determined from
one period to the next.
222
Let us assume that the E'S have mean zero and variances 01' 02' 03'
o~ respectively. It is probably reasonable to expect that firms are more
sensitive to constraints than are individuals. The permanent income hypothesis
in its purest form would not leave any room for spillover effects in con-
sumption or in labor supply. Firms, although infinitely 11ved in principal,
do not allow their inventories to serve as a complete buffer when plans
cannot be carried out. Some of the impact of sales constraints is to
lower production, even in the short-run. Therefore we will assume through-
out the rest of this section that
-22-
a > b
(4.1)
c > d •
To derive the probabilities of the four regimes we use the inequality
constraints defining them (2.LI) -
1
written entirely in terms of v
t
=
Independent Shocks
(2.14) •
1 . 2
E: - E:
t t
These
2
and v
t
constraints
3 4
E: - E:t t·
can be
The first specification of the errors that we will consider is the
case in which they are independently distributed.
It is natural then to define
2 2 2
° == °1 + °2v1
(4.2)
2 2 2
° • °3 + °4v 2
I Li l-l / 2
Pr[Regime i] == --:::"21T---
If in addition we postulate normality, then
5f
o 0
with
r •1
-23-
1: • (2 + 22 d02 +002
1
o a 03 vl v2 vl v2
d02 + 402 d202 +02
vl v2 vl v2
I: 4 •
2
+ b202 2 20 -do - bo
vl v2 vl v2
2 2 d202 +02
-do - bo
vl v2 vl v2
The probabilities of the different regimes can be ranked according
to the Correlation coefficients, Pi between ~ and ~2 as specified by the
matrices 1: i.
P2 =
d 2 + 2 2o a 0
P = v l v 23
2
PI ~ I - (b - lie)
2
P3 W 1 - (a - lid)
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The highest probabilities are associated with the Keynesian unemp1oy-
ment (Regime 1) and repressed inflation (Regime 3) modes, where the corre-
lations are positive. An intuition for this result can be derived from
the observation that when errors occur one at a time only Regime I and 3
are possible. This point is due to the fact that the first effect of a
shock is to constrain one agent (firms or consumers) in one market and by
the spillover effect the other agent in the other market. The stability
conditions imply that one remains then in a regime where both agents are
constrained, i.e. either Keynesian unemployment or repressed inflation.
The comparison between Regimes I and 3 and between Regimes 2 and 4 is
difficult and depends on the variances and on the spillover coefficients.
One possibility to obtain further results can be obtained if we are willing
to make the assumption that shocks originating on the consumers' side of
both markets are small compared to producers shocks.* This can be de-
22·
scribed by letting a /a be small. Under these conditions PI and P3 can
v2 vI
be approximated as
2
a
v2
-r
a
vI
2
a
v2
-r-
a
vI
Regime 1 will be more likely than Regime 3 if
2 2(a - lid) > (b - lie)
* This is the implicit assumption in much of Keynes and is made explicit in
the work of Malinvaud.
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Even under the maintained hypotheses (4.1) this comparison could still go
*either way.
Three Cases of Non-Independent Shocks
We shall now consider three cases where the errors are interpreted
as shocks to the technology and preferences of a particular form and are
not, therefore, independent across the equations. Let us first consider
firms. Suppose that there is a unit increase in labor demanded as the
result of some factors exogenous to the model, for example a change in the
tax rules governing employment. If the entire output of these workers is
splaced on the market, x increases by g -- that is
t
(4.2)
On the other extreme, the additional output could be divided between inven-
tory accumulation and sales in the same proportion that would be caused by
an involuntary rather than a voluntary shock to employment. Then one \JOuld
have
(4.3)
Recall that 0 < a < g.
For individuals the argument is slightly more involved, but one ob-
tains similar extreme cases as approximations. An exogenous increase of
one unit in the level of labor offered to the market brings in a real
income of wt - Pt in period t. Therefore the appropriate increase in
demand for goods, under the hypothesis that all of this income is to be
* To confirm the further intuition of Malinvaud that Keynesian unemployment
is more likely than repressed inflation, one would have to invoke a bias
of the price setting mechanism away from the anticipated Walrasian levels.
spent, is w
t
- p
t'
...26~
Under this assumption, the relationship between the
4 2
shocks to labor supply, € , and goods demand, e , depends on the prices
t t
prevailing in that period. This would make the analysis of the quantity-
constrained equilibrium virtually as complex as the system with independent
errors. It is more tractable if we take the approximation that w
t
- Pt is,
in the long-run, equal to the real marginal product of labor g. This would
give us
(4.4)
which is analagous to (4.2). Alternatively, we can suppose that the extra
earnings are divided between spending on goods and accumulation of money
balances in the same proportion that the individual allocates his constrained
labor income. Since one unit less of labor supply causes goods demand to
drop by b, we obtain
(4.5) 2e
t
It is possible to examine each of the four possible combinations of
these assumptions (4.2) or (4.3), together with either (4.4) or (4.5). To
obtain the flavor of the analysis, however, we report on only three of these
cases. We will see that the results are rather sensitive to this specification.
(4.2) and (4.5) : (Firms'shocks affect flows only, individuals' shocks affect
demands for money and goods)
The regimes are then defined by
Regime 1
Regime 2
(g - b) e 3 > 0
t
(eg - 1) €~ + (1 _ be) 4 > 0 '
€t
3 4(eg-l)€t + (l-eb)e t < 0
Regime 3
Regime 4
Then
p •
1
(4.6)
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3 4(g-ah: + (a-b) E <-0t t
(dg-l)e:~ + U-bd)e:;' < 0
3(g-b)E < 0
t
3 4(dg-l)E
t
+ (l-bd)E t > 0
2 2
_ (g-a) (cg-l)03 + (a-b)(1-cb)04
2 2 2 2 2 2([(g-a) 03 + (a-b) 04][(cg-l) 03 +
·22
= (g-a) (dg-l)o3 + (a-b) (1-bd)04
P3
22 22 22 22 ~([(g-a) 03 + (a-b) 04][(dg-l) 03 + (I-bd) 04])
p = _ (dg-l)03
4 -----------2 2 2 2 ~
«dg-I) 03 + (l-bd) 04)
Uoing (4.1) we find that PI < 0: 04 > 0, (JZ ann (>3 being aMbipuous. If
the shocks on the consumer side are also smaller than on the producer side
we have in general Pz > 0 P3 < 0, thus ranking Regimes 2 and 4, under
consumption and classical unemployment, "Tit;) the highest probability. If
the shocks on the consumer side are greater (because of shocks in demand)
we get Pz < 0 and P3 > O. Repressed inflation and classical unemployment
become the most likely regimes.
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In summary, this specification of the shocks implies that Regime 4,
Classical Unemployment, will be the most common occurrenc~,with Regimes 2
and 3, Underconsumption and Repressed Inflation occurring less frequently.
We now consider the case where none of the effects of the shocks
impact upon the stocks of inventories or of money balances:
(4.2) and (4.4): (Both sectors' shocks affect only their notional demand
for flows.)
This case is a good deal simpler than that studied above because it
implies that v~ = g v~. Since v~ and v~ completely determine the nature
of the short-run equilibrium, as described in Section 2, the regimes are
defined by
1 2
v - av > 0
t t
I 2
v - av < 0
t t
1.
2.
3.
4.
1
v
t
1
v
t
I 2
cv - v > 0
t t
1 2
cv - v < 0
t t
dvl _ v2 < 0
t t
dvl _ v2 > 0
t t
1 2Using v = g v and the conditions 0 < a < g, llc > g > 0, 0 < b < g,
t t
and lid> g > 0, we find that only Regimes 2 and 4, that is only Undercon-
sumption and classical unemployment ,are possible. Note that no assumption
2 2
was made here about the relative size·of the variances 0 and 0 , and
vI v2
indeed the probabilities of the regimes would be invariant to such a speci-
fication, given our assumption that money balances and inventories are in-
sulated from the shocks.
Finally we look at the case in which both sectors allocate the shock
between the stock they control and current notional demands in the same
proportion as they would for a constraint on their trades.
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(4. i and (4.5): (Both sectors' shocks affect notional demands for flows
and stocks.)
Substituting into the basic definitions of the regimes we obtain
3 4
their dependence on e: t and e: t in this case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
3(a-b)e: > 0t
3 4
-(l-ac)e: + (l-bc)e: > 0t t
4(a-b)e: > 0
t
3 4 0-(l-ac)e: + (l-bc)E: <t t
4(a-b)E < 0
t
3 4
-(l-ad)E + (l-bd)e: < at t
3(a-b)e: < a
t
3 4
- (l-ad)E + (l-bd)E: > a .t t
2 2If we assume that a /a
v2 vI
ishingly small probability and
3
e: > 0, the
t
is small we find that Regime 1 has a van-
3that Regime 4 will occur whenever E: < O. lHth
t
4
sign of E: determines whether we are in Regime 2 or 3. There-
fore the appropriate probabilities of Regimes 2, 3, and 4 are 1/4, 1/4,
and 1/2 respectively.
2 2The. case of a /a small, which admittedly has little support in theVI v2
literature, would yield asymptotically the probabilities (1/4, 0, 1/2, 1/4)
for the four regimes respectively. Combining these results we see that
Regimes 3 and 4 are going to be more likely than Regimes 1 and 2, whatever
the error structure is. The goods market is systematically more likely to
be in excess supply than in excess demand!
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We can see t therefore t that the nature of the shocks is an important
determinant of the probability of reaching any of the regimes. If direct
evidence were available as to the nature of the binding quantity constraints
*at different points in time, indirect evidence would be available as to the
relative magnitude of the shocks.
* For example, suitable unemployment/vacancy data would be relevant to
the labor market. Evidence in the goods market is harder to ascertain
since intended inventory movements may be confounded with flow disequilibrium.
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5. Dynamic Behavior of Quantity-Constrained E~ui1ibrium Process
In this section we will utilize the stochastic structure derived
above to study the dynamics of inventories, employment, output, the real
wage and correlations among them. We will compare the results of the
disequilibrium model to those arising from a system where prices are
flexible ~fter the realization of the shocks, as described in Section 3.
In particular we will ask whether or not these systems are "observationally
equivalent", and we will suggest methods for testing one of these hy-
potheses against the other.
The dynamics of inven~orie~
In this model inventories are entirely composed of unsold stocks of
final goods. Because there is no depreciation, the change in stocks is
simply the difference between production and sales. The evolution of in-
ventories is described by
(5.1)
Equation (5.1) is a stochastic difference equation because it and xt are
random variables that depend on the underlying SIS, and on the current value
of St. Recognizing this dependence explicitly, we obtain a relation that
is piecewise linear in the £ •
t
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(5.2) gL -x +
t t
2 4
-e + ge
t t
I 2 3 4
e (gd-l)+e d(a-g)+e a(l-gd)+e (g-a) ,t t t· t
I 3
-e + ge
t t
Regime I
Regime 2
Regime 3
Regime If
iLet ~ (e
t
) denote the linear form in the £ associated with regime i,
in equations (5.2), i=I,2,3,4.Consider the anticipated change in inventory
stocks, that is, the change that would happen if all the e's were zero and
prices were set as we have postulated.
Let un define the coefficient on the right hand aide to be KO' a function
only of the parameters of the system. KO is the effect on the anticipated
change in inventories due to one unit of additional initial stocks. When
oI and O2 are small, it can be verified that 1 > KO > 0 and hence that the
process is stable •
. We can express the dynamics of inventories in a succint way by de-
ifining the function He
t
) to have the value of ep (e
t
) whenever e
t
lies in
regime i. Thus ~(€t) is defined over the whole range of e
t
. In this notation
(5.4)
or·
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(5.5)
Equation (5.4) can now be analyzed under a variety of conditions
corresponding to particular assumptions on the joint distribution of £
t
As the details are straightforward, we will only summarize the results here.
If the four shocks are independent, little can be said in general
about the Markov process defined by (5.4). The mean value of the error
term averaged over the four regimes will not be zero because they enter
in a piecewise linear, rather than a linear, fashion. Therefore the long-
run average for St will be biased away from its target s.
It is interesting to ask whether the time series behavior of inven-
tories can be used to distinguish between this model and the equilibrium
model of Section 3.
Using (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) we can see that in the equilibrium stock
adjustment equation will be of the same general form as (5.5) but the
errors enter linearly. This suggests the following test of the equilibrium
model.
Write the equilibrium model as
"
(5.6)
paralleling the notation of (5.5). The error term will have mean zero.
eq-If this equation were estimated, KO s would be the value of the constant.
Moreover, if the data were partitioned into various subsets, the same constant
would be consistantly estimated in each of them. This should be contrasted with
the case of disequilibrium as in (5.5). If the data were partitioned according to
th i i diff 1 Koeq -s + E~i( ) i he var ous reg mes, a ere.nt constant, name y ~ £t ,w t
..
,.
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the expectation conditioned on regime i~ would be observed in each regime.
Of course it is not obvious at all which regime is operative at which
point. Unlike previous work in disequilibrium econometrics~ the direction
of the price change in our model does not indicate anything about the
effective quantity constraints. Therefore the brute force procedure would
be to estimate the disequilibrium system by maximum likelihood methods
T
separately for each of the 4 partitions of the T data points~ allowing
a different constant in each regime~ and·then to perform a likelihood
ratio test of the overall maximum likelihood among these reg.rcssions
against the equation estimated with a single constant.
Of course if T is fairly large this method becomes impractical. Some
economies of computation are possible~ however~ under more restrictive
hypotheses about the joint distribution of the components of £ •
t
With the assumption that shocks do not impinge upon the notional in-
ventory~ but that individuals divide shocks between money balances and flow
demands) (4.2) and (4.5), we can derive from (5.2)
2 34E~ (£ ) = 0, E~ (£ ) < 0 and E~ (£ ) = 0 (indeedt t t
> 0,
These quali-
tative constraints can be used to check the maximum likelihood estimations of
the four regimes: the estimated constants in Regime 1 exceed those of Regimes
2 and 4 which in turn exceed that in Regime 3. Moreover these constraints
can provide an algorithm for partitioning the data, if (4.2) and (4.5)
are adopted as maintained hypotheses. For example, if a~ is thought to
2dominate 04' we know from (4.6) that Regimes 2 and 4 become far more likely
than 1 and 3. We might therefore begin by running the unconstrained regression
(5.5)~ ignoring the biased error term, and then assign that half of the data
'1c
with the largest residuals to Regime 4 and the others to Regime 2.
* This method is reminiscent of the Fair - Jaffee (1972) procedure.
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Another case of interest, paralleling the treatment of the last section,
occurs where the shocks affect current notional demands and desired stocks
in the same proportion as would quantity constraints: (/•• 3) and (4.5).
We have from (5.2) that
(5.7)
Recalling the results on the probability distribution over these
2 2
regimes when 0 /0 is small we know that Regime I is not possible, and
v2 vI
3 4Regimes 2, 3, and 4 occur approximately whenever £ > ° and £ > 0,
343
e:> ° and e: < 0, and e: < ° respectively. From (5.7) we see that the biases
induced in the constants in Regimes 2 and 3 will be small, since E£4 1e:
4
> °
31 3is small compared to Ee: e: < 0. Thus an~proximate test of the disequilibrium
model under the maintained hypotheses (4.3), (4.5), is to segregate the data
into two subsets, presumably those in or out of Regime 4, and test for the
inequality of the constants in these separate regressions. (Of course this
will be a weaker test than the full maximum likelihood procedure, but the
computational advantages may be significant.)
Other combinations .of (4.2) (4.3) and (4.4) (4.5) can be studied with
similar results.
Correlation between real wag~~__an~~qy~~tories
In the disequilibrium model we have studied, the anticipatory nature of
the price adjustment process makes the real wage a function of inventories
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alone. Therefore, in the absence of observational errors, a perfect
(negative) correlation between them would be observed.
The equilibrium model's real wage is given by (3.1). It is easy to
show that the coefficient of (s - s) is the same in this equation as it is
t
in the disequilibrium theory. The two dHfer only in the presence of the
error term. Because of observational errors, however, we cannot discriminate
between them.
Correlation between employment and_j~~~ntories
In the disequilibrium model the realized levels of employment are
given by
1 - bc
(5.8) R,t
1 2 3 4
d ( e: t - e: t) - ade: t + e: t
1 - ad
Regime 1
Regime 2
Regime 3
Regime 4
The dependence of L t , anticipated employment if there are no shocks, on
inventories can be computed from (1.21), (1.22) and (1.23) to be:
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In the equilibrium model employment is given by (3.2). Note that the
systematic dependence of employment on inventories is the same under either
theory.
As in the case of the autocorrelation of the inventory series, the
difference lies in the stochastic structure. Different constant terms in
the regressions within each regime would provide evidence for the dis-
equilibrium hypothesis.
We will not elaborate upon the possibilities under all the stochastic
specifications treated previously. It is useful, however, to examine one of
them again because it indicates how a combination of evidence on inventories
and employment can help identify regimes and provide a sharper discrimination
between these theories.
Consider the case of (4.3) and (4.5), where disturbances impinge upon
notional demand for stocks in both sectors. The relations (5.8) become:
(l-ac) 3
I-be Et
4
E
t
(5.9) ~ Bt +t
4
E
t
3
E
t
Regime 1
Regime 2
Regime 3
Regime 4
equation (5.7).
Compare these errors to the analagous terms in the inventory dynamics
2 2When d fa is small, the sign of the errors in each of
Vz vI
the three possible regimes is precisely the same in (5.9) as it is in (5.7).
Therefore, if we identify a particular partition of the data points for one
equation, then under the maintained hypotheses about the errors, the constants
-38
estimated by maximum likelihood from the other equation should stand in the same
relationship across the regimes when the data are partitioned the same way.
2 2Indeed a further check is possible, using the fact that a fa is
v2 vI
small. We can neglect the difference between the constants estimated in
Regimes 2 and 3 compared with their relation to that in Regime 4. From
(5.9) and (5.7) we can see that the difference between Regime 4 and the
other two in the employment regressions is E£~I£~ < 0, and in the inven-
tory autoregression it is (g~a) E£3 1£3 < O. We can infer that the cross-t t
equation difference in the constants in the inventory autoregression
should be less than g times the bias in the employment regressions, because
a > O. (The productivity of labor, g, can be estimated as the average real
wage, so this procedure is well-defined.)
Correlation between real wages and~loyment
Both the disequilibrium and equilibrium models predict a negative
correlation between real wages and employment when (01 + 02) is relatively
small. Tests based on the stochastic structure similar to those described
above can be constructed, but we believe that they will be harder to use.
There are difficulties in constructing a real wap,e series corrected for the
changing composition of the labor force and the problem of obtaining
wage rates when overtime and other considerations distort the relationship
between hours of employment and total earnings.
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Appendix
We gather together a few regression results that are related to the
results of this paper. No attempt is made to give a detailed treatment of
problems in structural estimation of macroeconomic systems. These results
should be viewed merely as exploring some correlations in the data, and not
as necessarily confirming or disproving specific hypotheses.
Nevertheless we believe they are of interest. In particular they
point out the strong influence of inventories on the real wage.
The variables used are:
W, wage The real wage in the manufacturing sector. Computed as the
ratio"of hourly earnings to the implicit price deflator for
personal consumption expenditures.
H, hours The measure of total manufacturing employment. Computed as
the product of weekly hours for production workers with total
employment in the manufacturing sector.
INV, inventories Total inventories in the manufacturing sector.
IMP, import price
index Index of unit-values of imported goods.
All data are seasonally adjusted.
We present three sets of regressions for monthly, quarterly and annual
data. In accordance with the theory, we treat as exogenous the initial level
of inventories.
In the monthly regressions we use the previous month's value. In
both quarterly and annual regressions we use the value associated with the
last month of the previous time period.
The wage, hours inventories and import prices are used in logarithms,
time is not used as a logarithm.
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Monthly
(1) -6 2W= 1.58 - 0.095 Lag INV + .0018 T + 3.5 x 10 T - 0.11 IMP
(12.6) (-3.1) (8.7) (3.4) (-4.7)
corrected for first-order autocorrelation: p = .82
(18.6)
DW ... 1.95
(2) W= 1.70 - 0.123 Lag INV + .002 T + 6.0 x 10-6 T2
(9.3) (-2.7) (.05)
corrected for first-order autocorrelation: p = .91
(26.8)
-2R = .995 DW ... 1.94
(3) H = 7.56 - 0.250 Lag INV + .0039 T - 3.6 x 10-6 T2 - 0.17 IMP
(9.1) (-1.2) (2.5) (-.49) (-1.4)
corrected for second-order autocorrelation: p = 1.2 ,p = -.227
1 (15.7) 2 (-2.9)
DW ... 2.08
(4) -6 2H ... 7.91 - 0.332 Lag INV + .0042 T - 7.8 x 10 T
(11.1) (-1.9) (2.8) (-1.0)
corrected for second-order autocorrelation: p = 1.2 ,P2 = -.228
1 (15.8) (-2.9)
-2R = .966 ml = 2.08
Quarterly
(5) -5 2W == 1.58 - 0.096 Lag INV +.. 0055 T + 3.7 x 10 T - 0.12 IMP
(12.1) (-3.0) (8.1) (3.6) (...4,9)
corrected for first-order autocorrelation: p = .63
(5.6)
DW = 1.96
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(6) W = 1.77 - 0.141 Lag INV + .0062 T + 3.5 x 10-6 T2
(9.3) (-3.0) (5.5) (.28)
corrected for first-order autocorrelation: P = .80
(8.7)
-2R III .990 DW III 1.74
(7) H = 8.81 - 0.549 Lag INV + .0154 T - 3.9 x 10-5 T2 - 0.04 IMP
(7.6) (-1.9) (2.5) (-.49) (-.Z6)
corrected for second-order autocorrelation: P1= 1.46 ,PZ = -0.54(10.9) (-4.3)
-2R .... 911 DW "" 2.05
(8) H "" 8.90 - 0.571 Lag INV + .0157 T - 5.0 x 10-5 T2
(8.5) (-2.2) (2.6) (-.69)
corrected for second-order autocorrelation: PI = 1.36 ,
(11. 2)
P2 = -0.55(-4.4)
-2R = .913
Annual
DW = 2.04
(9) W • 1. 65
(17.6)
- 0.116 Lag INV + .0228 T + .0006 TZ - 0.11 IMP
(-5.0) (12.7) (3.0) (-4.9)
corrected for second-order autocorrelation: PI "" -0.48
RZ .... 991 DW'" 2.43 (-1.4)
Pz = -0.46(-1. 3)
(10) W=1.71
(8.0)
R2 = .970
- 0.129 Lag INV + .OZ5 T - 9.3 x 10-5 TZ
(-2.4) (5.7) (-.47)
DW = 1. 69
(11) W= 1.71 - 0.128 Lag INV + .025 T - 7.5 x 10-5 T2
(6.0) (-1. 8) (4.0) (-.33)
corrected for first-order autocorrelation: P = 0.10
(0.2)
-2R a .966 DW"" 1.77
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(12) W· 1.24 - 0.015 Lag INV + .0202 T - .0004 T2
(6.4) (-.32) (5.6) (-2.4)
corrected for second-order autocorrelation: P1= 0.33 , P2 = -0.81(1.3) (-4.5)
-2R = .982 DW = 2.25
(13) R .. 7.39
(7.6)
'R2 = .045
- 0.201 Lag INV + .0343 T - .0004 T2 - 0.14 IMP
(-.84) (1.6) (-.27) (-.65)
DW = 1.17
(14) R = 8.54 - 0.494 Lag INV + .056 T - .0006 T2 - 0.10 IMP
(5.8) (-1.4) (2.2) (-.34) (-.34)
Corrected for first-order autocorrelation: P = .62
(15)
-2R III .202
R'· 9.27
(13.3)
DW ... 1.09
- 0.664 Lag INV + .0580 T + .0005 T2 - 0.13 IMP
(-3.9) (2.7) (.28) (-.48)
corrected for second-order autocorrelation: PI
'R2 = .615 DW = 1.61
= 1.18
(4.6)
P2 = -0.77(-3.2)
(16) R = 8.72 - 0.537 Lag INV + .0632 T - .0010 T2
(8.6) (-2.2) (2.62) (-.69)
corrected for first-order autocorrelation: P = 0.65
(2.1)
-2R = .280
(17) R = 9.45
(15.8)
DW = 1.03
- 0.706 Lag INV + .0611 T - .0001 T2
(-4.8) (2.8) (-.11)
corrected for second-order autocorrelation: PI ... 1.23 ,P2= -0.77(5.1) (-3.7)
i 2 = .654 DW = 1.66
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Summary of Results
The principal reason for performing three separate types of regressions
is that we do not know the timing of the anticipatory pricing and the shocks
which are supposed to be accomodated by disequilibrium quantity adjust-
ments. No attempt was made to search for regressions with more explanatory
power, but we do present two forms of the equations according to whether
the import price index variable is included. It was felt that this variable
is largely exogenous and that it exerts a strong influence on prices and
output quite independent of the inventory situation.
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